Michigan Law Review
Volume 65

Issue 7

1967

Income Tax- Corporations-Legal Expenses Incurred in Sale of
Assets Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation Are
Deductible-United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co.
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Income Tax- Corporations-Legal Expenses Incurred in Sale of Assets Pursuant to a
Section 337 Liquidation Are Deductible-United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 65 MICH. L. REV.
1508 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol65/iss7/13

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1508

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65

INCOME TAX: CORPORATIONS-Legal Expenses Incurred
in Sale of Assets Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation
Are Deductible-United States v. Mountain States
Mixed Feed Co.*
In 1961, the stockholders of the Mountain States Mixed Feed Co.
voted to liquidate the corporation in such a way as to comply with the
requirements of section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(Code).1 That section provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of
complete liquidation, and then within twelve months distributes all
its assets, it will not recognize a gain or loss for income tax purposes
from the sale or exchange of certain types of property.2 The corporation sold all of its assets and qualified for non-recognition treatment
under section 337. It then claimed a net operating loss of $7,319.15
on its income tax return. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
however, determined that the corporation had earned a taxable income of $29,080.30, and accordingly he assessed additional income
taxes.3 Part of the difference between the two calculations was the
result of the Commissioner's disallowance of a claimed deduction of
$4,000 for legal expenses relating to the sale of the corporation's assets
in liquidation. The Commissioner reasoned that since the expenses
were incurred in connection with a sale of assets in liquidation, they
were not properly deductible as ordinary and necessary business ex• 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337. This section, an addition to the Code in 1954, pro•
vides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, and then within
twelve months distributes all its assets except those necessary to meet claims, no gain
or loss from the sale or exchange of certain property within the twelve-month period
will be recognized by the corporation for income tax purposes. For a detailed discussion
of the procedures involved in the various types of liquidation, see Cohen, Gelberg,
Surrey, Tarleau 8e Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 37 (1955); MacLean, Taxation of Sales of Corporate Assets
in the Course of Liquidation, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 641 (1956). On the deductibility of expenses incurred in liquidation, see 4A MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 25.35, at 154 (1966).
2. Section 337(a) provides in pertinent part that if:
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22,
1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of
such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.
3. The facts of the case have been simplified considerably for the purposes of this
discussion. The District Court was also presented with two other questions: the validity
of the Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction for depreciation of assets which had
been sold in 1961 for a price in excess of their depreciated basis; and the soundness of
the Commissioner's conclusion that the corporation's bad debt reserve constituted income to the plaintiff in 1962. Furthermore, the Commissioner contested the amount of
taXable income reported by the corporation for the years 1958, 1959, and 1961. Mountain
States Mixed Feed Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D.C. Colo. 1965).
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penses under section 162 of the Code.4 The corporation paid the additional assessment, and then sued for a refund. The district court ruled
in favor of the corporation. 5 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, held,
affirmed. Legal expenses for services rendered in connection with the
sale of assets in liquidation are expenses of carrying out the liquidation, and as such may be deducted from income as ordinary and necessary business expenses.6
·
The advantage to the corporate taxpayer in having the expenses
in question deducted from ordinary income rather than merely used
to offset its gain from the sale of the assets can best be illustrated by
the following hypothetical example. Assume the taxpayer in the
process of liquidating sells a building with a basis of $10,000 and
receives $15,000 from the sale. Assume further that $1,000 in legal
expenses are incurred in connection with this transaction. If the taxpayer meets the requirements of section 337, the $5,000 gain realized
on the sale would not be recognized for income tax purposes. In addition, under the decision of the principal case, the $1,000 in legal expenses would be deductible under section 162 from the other income
of the corporation. If the decision of the Commissioner were to prevail, however, the $1,000 would not be deductible under section 162
but would merely be taken into account when computing the gain
from the sale of the building-($15,000 minus $10,000 minus $1,000
equals $4,000).7 Thus, the gain on the sale of the building would be
reduced, but since that gain is not recognized under section 337, the
corporation would derive no tax benefit from the legal expenses.
The result reached in the principal case has some support in previous decisions; yet, it appears to be contrary to the policy of section
337, since in addition to the benefit of non-recognition of gain intended by the Code, it also confers an unintended tax benefit-the
ability to deduct expenses relating to non-taxable transactions from
other income earned by the corporate taxpayer.
It is well settled that attorney's fees, accountant's fees, appraisal
costs, and the fees of transfer agents are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses when incurred in connection with the
planning of a complete liquidation.8 The issue of the deductibility
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, deals with the deductibility of ordinary and necessary trade and business expenses. Some deductions have been particularized by Congress
(§§ 163-77), but most business expenses still must be justified under the more general
language of the "ordinary and necessary" provision found in § 162.
5. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 369, 372 (1965).
6. Principal case at 246.
.
7. This is the basic formula employed in Federal Income Tax Form 1120, Schedule
D, Parts I-III. The same method of computation is used in the individual income tax
return-Federal Income Tax Form 1040, Schedule D, Part I, item 1-f.
8. Pridemark v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) reversing 42 T.C. 510
(1964); Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); Arcade
Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Rite-Way Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 475
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of planning expenses was first raised in Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v.
Commissioner, 9 which held those expenses to be deductible. The
court met the objection that liquidation expenses were not ordinary
expenses of carrying on a trade or business by emphasizing that dissolution and liquidation were in the nature of a final accounting to
both the corporate shareholders and the state of incorporation.10 In
any business in which the management and the ownership are distinct, a periodic accounting of the operations is required and is
usually viewed as an ordinary aspect of carrying on the business. The
Pacific Biscuit court reasoned that the process of liquidation is similar to that of a required accounting, and thus should also be viewed
as an ordinary incident to the running of a business. The court recognized that few corporations can be said to be perpetual; liquidations due to financial failures, the retirement of officers or partners,
or for other reasons are not unusual occurrences. Thus, the court decided that the costs of the liquidation should be considered ordinary
business expenses. 11
The Pacific Biscuit case, however, was not direct authority
for the holding in the principal case, since Pacific was concerned
with the expenses of planning a liquidation, whereas the principal case dealt with the expenses of putting the plan into effect
-specifically, the costs involved in selling the assets. In only two
other cases has a court been presented with the argument that
was advanced by the Commissioner in the principal case. In Otto
F. Ruprecht, 12 a corporation that was engaged in the business of
holding and renting real property sold all of the land that it possessed in pursuance of a plan of complete liquidation. The Tax Court
disallowed the company's deduction of the legal expenses incurred in
that sale on the ground that these expenses were not the costs of dissolving the corporation, but rather arose in connection with the sale
(1949); E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), acq., 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 7, affd, 128 F.2d 4
(5th Cir. 1942); Pacific Biscuit Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acq., 1954-1
CUM. Buu.. 6.
9. 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acq., 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 6. In considering whether the expenses of the liquidation were "ordinary and necessary," the court relied on the test
formulated in the leading case of Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill (1933). There the
Supreme Court held that ordinary "does not mean that the payments must be habitual
or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit
affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may
be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary
one •..." Id. at 114. Assuming that a taxpayer would not incur an expenditure unless
it was required by the needs of the business, the courts have appeared hesitant to second
guess the taxpayer's judgment as to the necessity of the expense. See 4A MERTENS, I.Aw
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.09, at 39 (1966).
10. 32 B.T.A. at 43.
11. There is, however, a school of thought that feels liquidation expenses are not expenses of carrying on a trade or business. See, e.g., Fewell, Deductibility of Attorney's
Fees, 8 TEXAS B.J. 72, 96 (1945).
12. 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1[ 61125 (1961).
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of its principal asset-land. The decision was based on the generally
accepted principle of accounting that expenses connected with the
sale of property are not deductible as business expenses but rather are
taken into account in measuring the gain or loss on the sale.13 On the
other hand, in the later case of Pridemark v. Commissioner, 14 the
Fourth Circuit reversed a Tax Court decision, which was in accord
with Ruprecht, on the grounds that there is no meaningful distinction between the legal fees incurred in connection with the sale of
assets in liquidation and the legal fees incurred in the planning of
that liquidation: both qualify equally as expenses of liquidating.
Thus, the Pridemark court held that it is permissible to deduct certain legal expenses incurred in connection with the sale of assets in
a complete liquidation.15
Aside from Pridemark, some support for the result reached in
the principal case may be implied from other decisions which did not
speak specifically to the issue of the principal case. In a. case decided
after Ruprecht16 involving a complete liquidation, the Tax Court,
in deciding whether certain legal expenses connected with a liquidation were deductible, did not distinguish between the various purposes for which those expenses were incurred. 17 The few cases concerning partial liquidations also seem to support the decision reached in
the principal case. 18 In Gravois Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 19
a plan of partial liquidation was adopted when one of a corporation's
officers-a major shareholder-decided to retire. The corporation
lacked sufficient ready cash to purchase this shareholder's stock, so it
decided to make a partial payment consisting of land and an insurance policy. The corporation incurred legal expenses both in connection with the planning of the partial liquidation and in the process
of searching and transferring title to the land. In overruling the Tax
Court, 20 the Eighth Circuit did not attempt to separate the various
13. See Samuel C. Chapin, 12 T.C. 235, 238 (1949), afj'd, 180 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1950).
14. 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
15. 345 F.2d at 45.
16. Rushton v. Patterson, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119647 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
17. The legal expenses had been incurred in the sale of land, timber, a milling plant,
inventories, and accounts receivable. Id. 11 9647, at p. 89,584.
18. Farmer's Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1962); Gravois
Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962); Mill's Estate, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 910 (1951); Standard Linen
Serv., Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959); Tobacco Prods. Export Corp., 18 T.C. llOO (1952). A partial
liquidation is defined in INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 346. As is the case with complete
liquidation, the loss or gain realized in the sale of certain property pursuant to a partial liquidation is not recognized by the corporation.
19. 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
20. The Tax Court had held that the corporation was actually undergoing reorganization and not a partial liquidation. Gravois Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 29
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 11 60122 (1960). Generally, the expenses of reorganization or recapitalization do not qualify under § 162 as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying
on a business. 299 F.2d 199,206 (8th Cir. 1962).
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sources of the legal expenses, but held that "attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred in connection with a corporation's complete liquidation and dissolution are deductible." 21 Thus, these decisions arguably evidence the willingness of the courts to allow the deduction of
the legal expenses incurred in the sale of assets.
Aside from pointing out the administrative difficulty of allocating
the attorney's fees among the various services performed by the lawyers in the process of liquidation, 22 the main thrust of the taxpayer's
argument in the principal case was that since there would have been
no sale but for the liquidation, the sale of assets was made in carrying out the liquidation; therefore, the selling expenses should be
viewed as deductible business costs.23 On the other hand, however,
the position taken by the Commissioner is not without merit. In the
first place, Ruprecht has not been expressly overruled, and thus
theoretically is still good precedent for denying the deduction. Moreover, as pointed out in Ruprecht, if the corporation had merely sold
an asset and not liquidated, the attorney's fee incurred in connection
with that sale would have been used as an offset against the purchase
price to reduce the amount of gain on the sale, and not as a deduction
from the income of the corporation. It is arguable that the same rule
should apply when the assets are sold pursuant to a liquidation.
Furthermore, allowing a corporation to deduct the expenses of a
sale of assets in liquidation confers an additional benefit on the corporation that is not contemplated by the non-recognition provisions
of section 337. The purpose of section 337 was to eliminate the double taxation that resulted when a corporation liquidated by selling
its assets and distributing the cash received from that sale, rather than
by distributing the assets themselves directly to the shareholders.24
Congress decided that the method by which a corporation that is un21. 299 F.2d at 206. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Rite-Way Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 475 (1949).
22. Principal case at 245.
23. In adopting the taxpayer's argument, the court said:
[I]t is difficult to determine any reason in the authorities or in the statutes for
any distinction as to the type or purpose of the legal work involved. It is probable
that the attorneys could account for the time they devoted to the corporate dis•
solution as compared with the sale of assets, but there is no reason why this
sale of assets is not as much a .part of the liquidation as the dissolution of the
corporation. Certainly if the costs of distribution in kind may be deducted as
ordinary expenses, the legal cost of the sale of assets should likewise be deductible. Thus it is all a part of the liquidation-dissolution of the corporate entity.
Principal case at 245.
24. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), is illustrative of the
problems that arose prior to enactment of § 337 when the corporation was taxed on
gains from the sale of assets pursuant to liquidation, and when the shareholders were
also taxed when they exchanged their stock for their share of the liquidation proceeds.
The alternative of distribution of the assets in kind is, in most cases, not only impractical, but shareholders are often hesitant or unwilling to receive assets in kind without assurance of an immediate resale market. MacLean, Taxation of Sales of Assets in
the Course of Liquidation, 56 Coum:. L. REv. 641 (1956).
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dergoing liquidation disposes of its assets should be determined by
business considerations rather than by a concern with tax assessments.25 The solution provided by section 337 is that the corporation's gain or loss from such a sale of assets will not be recognized.
The section contains no language to the effect that the taxpayer can
alter the method of computing gain by labeling as a business expense
that which would normally be used as an offset against the purchase
price. In effect, the taxpayer is taking the costs of a particular transaction-a sale pursuant to a liquidation-for which Congress has
already provided a tax benefit, and then treating those costs as a deduction from income derived from other sources which are wholly
unrelated to the liquidation.
While it may be true that the sale of assets in the principal case
was a direct result of the liquidation, the logical extension of the
court's position could lead to undesirable consequences. For example,
if during a liquidation a corporation finds it necessary to spend five
thousand dollars to renovate an asset in order to make it marketable,
this sum would be deductible, under the reasoning of the court, since
but for the liquidation the expense would not have been incurred.
While such an interpretation seems unlikely, serious consideration
should be given to amending either section 337 or section 162 to
make clearer the question of the deductibility of various liquidation
expenses.
25. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954). To illustrate the effect of
§ 337, assume that a single-shareholder-corporation has assets with a fair market value

of $10~,000 and that the cost of selling these assets would be $5,000. Assume further
that the shareholder's basis in the stock is zero. If the corporation distributes its assets
directly to the shareholder, he will realize a capital gain of $105,000, the difference between his basis in the stock and the fair market value of the property received. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 331. The basis of the assets in the hands of the shareholder will be
$105,000-the fair market value of the assets at the time of distribution. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 334(a). If he then sells the property for $105,000, the $5,000 expenses incurred
in making the sale will be offset against the total sales price. Thus his net cash receipt
on the entire transaction would be $100,000 and, assuming a 25% tax, he would end
up with $75,000 cash in hand.
On the other hand, if the corporation itself sells the assets, section 337 provides that
it will not recognize any gain or loss. After paying the expenses of the sale, the corporation, therefore, will have $100,000 to distribute to the shareholder. This $100,000 will
be treated as capital gain to the shareholder and, again assuming a 25% tax, the shareholder will have a net cash receipt of $75,000.
Thus, under § 337, the shareholder's cash position is not dependent upon whether
the corporation's assets are sold by the corporation itself or by the shareholder. However, if the $5,000 expense of the sale incurred by the corporation constitutes an
ordinary income tax deduction (and if the $5,000 expense of sale is not deductible by
the shareholder when he sells the assets), there is a significant tax advantage in having
the corpor;ition effect the sale, and, consequently, tax considerations rather than
business considerations may determine the manner of liquidation.

